Cognitive models

As we have said, conceptual sciences, including cognitive psychology, are metaphorical in nature. Models of natural phenomena, in particular, cognitive models, are official abstract ideas derived from observations based on observations. The structure of the elements can be presented in the form of a periodic table, as Mendeleev did, but it is important not to forget that this classification scheme is a metaphor. And the statement that conceptual science is metaphorical does not in the least diminish its usefulness. Indeed, one of the tasks of building models is to better comprehend the observable. And conceptual science is needed for another: it gives the researcher a certain scheme within which one can test specific hypotheses and which allows him to predict events based on this model.

The periodic table very elegantly satisfied both of these tasks. Based on the location of the elements in it, scientists could accurately predict the chemical laws of compound and substitution, instead of conducting endless and erratic experiments with chemical reactions. Moreover, it has become possible to predict not yet open elements and their properties in the complete absence of physical evidence of their existence. And if you are engaged in cognitive models, do not forget the analogy with the Mendeleev model, because cognitive models, like models in the natural sciences, are based on the logic of inferences and are useful for understanding cognitive psychology.

In short, models are based on conclusions drawn from observations. Their task is to provide a intelligible representation of the nature of the observed and help to make predictions in the development of hypotheses. Now consider several models used in cognitive psychology.

Let us begin the discussion of cognitive models with a rather crude version, which divided all cognitive processes into three parts: the detection of stimuli, the storage and transformation of stimuli, and the development of responses:

This dry model, which is close to the previously mentioned SR model, was often used in one form or another in previous ideas about mental processes. And although it reflects the main stages in the development of cognitive psychology, there are so few details in it that it can hardly enrich our “understanding” of cognitive processes. She is also unable to generate any new hypotheses or predict behavior. This primitive model is similar to the ancient ideas of the universe as consisting of earth, water, fire and air. Such a system really represents one of the possible views on cognitive phenomena, but it incorrectly conveys their complexity.

One of the first and most frequently cognitive models related to memory. In 1890, James expanded the concept of memory, dividing it into "primary" and "secondary" memory. He assumed that primary memory deals with events that have occurred, and secondary memory with permanent, "indestructible" traces of experience.

Later, in 1965, Waugh and Norman proposed a new version of the same model and it turned out that it was largely acceptable. It is understandable, it can serve as a source of hypotheses and predictions - but it is also too simplified. Can it be used to describe all the processes of human memory? Hardly; and the development of more complex models was inevitable. A modified and updated version of the model of Bau and Norman is shown in Fig. 2. Note that a new storage system and several new information paths have been added to it. But even this model is incomplete and requires expansion.

Over the past decade, building cognitive models has become a favorite pastime for psychologists, and some of their creations are truly magnificent. Usually, the problem of overly simple models is solved by adding another “block”, another information path, another storage system, another element worth checking and analyzing. Such creative efforts look quite justified in the light of what we now know about the richness of the human cognitive system.

Now you can conclude that the invention of models in cognitive psychology was out of control, like a wizard's student. This is not entirely true, for this is such an extensive task - that is, analysis of how information is found appears to be transformed into knowledge, and how this knowledge is used - that no matter how we limit our conceptual metaphors to simplified models, we still will not be able to exhaustively clarify the entire complex sphere of cognitive psychology .

1. Of course, it can be argued that this sequence of transformations begins with the subject's knowledge of the world, which allows him to selectively direct attention to certain aspects of visual stimuli and to ignore other aspects. So, in the above example, the policeman describes the driver’s road, dwelling mainly on where the driver will have to drive, and does not pay attention (at least active) to other signs: houses, pedestrians, the sun, other landmarks.
2. “For example, the policeman had to remember for a while that the driver was looking for Pay-Pakui, that he knew where the exhibition was located, and even (at least until the end of his question“ What motel did you stay at? ”) that the driver stopped at the motel. Similarly, the driver must remember for a while that there are two “Pay-Pakuy” stores (at least in order to answer that he needs the one who sells plumbing); whether he where was the exhibition of the Expo, that he needs to drive past the old mill, etc.
3. A number of theorists are of the opinion that some structures - for example, linguistic - are universal and innate.
4. In Solso, conceptual science is a science whose subject is concepts and theoretical constructions, and not physical nature, as in the natural sciences. The concept of conceptual science is narrower than the concept of the humanities, which includes psychology, philosophy, sociology, history, etc. The closest conceptual science is consistent with our term “science methodology,” Naukovedenie. - Approx. Ed.
5. Some philosophers argue that conceptual science and cognitive models are predictable on the grounds that nature is structured and the role of the scientist is precisely to discover the “deepest” structure. I would not subscribe to this statement.