CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY OF INTRACEPT

2.1. Subject activity in bodily perception

The recognition of the ontology of subjectivity confronts us with the need to solve a number of complex theoretical problems that do not exist within the framework of a reflex objectivist approach, in which the possibility of the emergence of both a separate sensation and a holistic image is limited only by the presence of a stimulus and an appropriate sensory apparatus capable of perceiving it. , receptors containing "specific energy", and "conduction paths" that transmit a signal to the receptor of the cortex, and then to the afferent links. The identification is carried out according to the “lock-key” principle, and all signals with the common property of switching on the receptor will act as identical.

Despite the obvious simplicity and logic of the reflex scheme, it is, nevertheless, not able to explain the real work of perception, and by now a large number of convincing theoretical arguments and experimental facts have been accumulated, showing the fundamental limitations of the reflector paradigm and the impossibility of building the framework of the non-contradictory model of cognitive processes (Uznadze, 1966; Bruner, 1977; Korshunov, 1979; Ilyenkov, 1979; Lektorsky, 1980; Smirnov, SD, 1985). Her criticism was conducted from various sides.

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First, from the side of physiology, which demonstrated on theoretical models and in concrete experiments, the impossibility of building even an elementary movement without the advanced “non-reflex” character of reflection {Bernstein, 1947, 1966; Anokhin, 1968) (although the “premature reflection” oxymoron itself, in my opinion, very well demonstrates methodological difficulties). Within the framework of the reflex scheme, it was impossible to explain even individual sensations, such as pain. Although the obvious biological value of pain, which signals tissue damage, should provide its basic character and be based on the simplest and purely physiological mechanism, many facts suggest that pain depends not only on the magnitude of the damage, and its perception it is not determined only by the properties of irritation ( Melzack , 1961; Kryzhanovsky, 1997; Melzak, 1981).

Secondly, this is contradicted by numerous psychological experiments, which indicate that a person does not accept reality as “as it is” { Gibson , 1950, 1966; Fraisse , 1967; Gregory, 1970, 1972; Itelson, 1971; Toidze, 1974; Wallach, 1976; Turvey , Show , 1979; Fodor , Polyshyn , 1981; Smirnov SD, 1981). “The thesis about the direct character of perception ... is quite clearly contrary to the main body of data on perceptual processes accumulated in psychology. From the Necker cube described in the last century and optical-geometric illusions to more recent Ames demonstrations and examples of the ambiguity of sentences in the generative transformational grammar (N. Khomsky. - A. T.) countless phenomena indicate that the internal representation of stimuli may be uncertain, unstable, defiantly inadequate ” (Velichkovsky, 1982, pp. 272—27 3). The incoming information has a huge number of degrees of freedom and cannot be the only source of orientation without adequate selection and structuring. The question of what impressions will be perceived and how stimulation will be reproduced is solved at the stage of the process preceding the very effect of the stimulus. The subject does not just pick up a stimulus, but chooses it, or even, rather, actively seeks it. Moreover, the stimulus that is being sought already has a definite interpretation, meaning and emotional-personal meaning. They seem to precede the stimulus, and are not “pulled out” of it (Stalin, 1976). In this sense, the description of the process of perception is more adequate to the metaphor of the “jug”, giving its perceived form to itself, rather than the metaphor of the “press”, without any change in transmitting the form of the perceived (Ortega-i-Gasset, 1990).

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The nature of perception cannot be inferred from knowledge of the conditions of stimulation, even when moving to the highest order variables. Thus, “individual signs of depth receive the status of real factors in determining the spatial organization of the taken, only when taken in relation to the available perceptual hypothesis in perception” {Bubbles, 1980, p. 17-18).

This or that stimulation can be correctly perceived only if there is an activity of the subject going out. “The characterization of the reflection as the leading suggests that it is not the result of only the changes made by the reflected object in the reflecting. On the contrary, the essence of reflection, determining the direction of its development from lower to higher forms, is the ability of the reflecting subject to develop a counter process, during which objectification is performed, the expression of its inner nature is outward ... This assumption gives a system of theoretical and methodological arguments to criticize the mechanistic theories of the mental image as the result of one-sided imprinting of the external in the internal. This is all the more relevant since approaches of this kind claim to be the status of the only consistently materialistic concepts ” {S. Smirnov, 1985, p. 129).

What, then, opposes the subject to the world perceived by him, what, in fact, is a true psychological tool (besides the obvious presence of safe and working sense organs) of “drawing up” information from the world? When answering this question, it must be remembered that the perceptive image born as a result of this meeting exists in the form of subjective qualities, not containing in itself any of the substance of the stimulus. Stimulation acquires its subjective existence only by "pouring" into the form of subjective units. It is obvious that these units are in a certain system, since we do not perceive the stimulus in its new quality each time (although it is impossible to imagine even two completely identical manifestations of the stimulus having an infinite number of degrees of freedom of projection, intensity, appearance conditions, etc. ). In short, to perceive a stimulus means to attribute it to a certain category. “Perception implies an act of categorization. In fact ... the following happens: we present the corresponding object to the subject, and it responds by assigning the perceived stimulus to one or another class of things or events. On this basis, only any of our theoretical arguments can be built ” {Bruner, 1977, p. 13).

From this point of view, perception is no different from knowledge at all and there is no reason to assume that the laws

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the categorization differs sharply from the laws of conceptual activity. At the same time it is not necessary that they be conscious or arbitrary. According to J. Bruner, who developed the old idea of ​​G. Helmgolitz about "unconscious inferences", "... the theory of perception must include, like the theory of knowledge, some mechanisms underlying the derivation and categorization" (ibid., P. 14).

This assumption does not at all mean the abandonment of the classical theory of sensory data. The point is that these data can be perceived only as an element of a certain set, but not as a unique and isolated event. “To establish the simplest order, a“ system of elements ”is needed, that is, the definition of segments within which similarities and differences can arise, the types of changes that these segments undergo, and finally, the threshold above which a difference will occur, and below — a similarity. {Foucault, 1977, p. 37).

Categorization is necessary even in mechanistic models that do not use the notion of a subject. BEFORE. Hebb, for example, assumed the existence of certain primitive forms of perceptual organization that make it possible to use signs to distinguish objects and assign them to a certain category ( Hebb , 1949). The physiological models of the mechanisms of such primary systems are proposed by PK Anokhin (1968) and E.N.Sokolov (1963) in the form of an “action acceptor” and a “nervous stimulus model”.

Moreover, categorization is obligatory for the existence of any subjective sensation in which it will detect itself. This is a very important point for clarification. By many psychologists, categorization is provided only for developed forms of perception and serves as a kind of supplement that draws up normal (natural) sensory data. In his analysis of the structure of consciousness, A.N. Leontyev (1975) as a basic, primary element highlights his “sensory fabric”. In his opinion, this “fabric” forms the sensual composition of specific images of reality actually perceived or emerging from memory. These images differ in tone, degree of clarity, stability, create a sensual composition of images, giving reality with knowledge. The notion of a category refers to abstract non-sensual formations, and the sensory fabric is opposed to meaning, as an amodal and supra-individual construct. The subject, according to A.N. Leontiev, is able to differentiate the perception of the real world and his inner phenomenal field. The first is represented in the mind by “significant images”, the second by “sensual fabric”. Sensual fabric can

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be presented in consciousness in two forms: as that in which the subject content for the subject (this constitutes the usual “normal” phenomenon), or by itself. In the latter case, the discrepancy is found either as a result of specially directed corrections, or in special experimental conditions. The possibility of differentiation of the phenomenal field and objective “significant” images is a feature of human consciousness, thanks to which a person is freed from the bondage of sensual impressions perverted by chance conditions. The idea of ​​differentiating the phenomenal field and subject images was also previously expressed by J. Gibson ( Gibson , 1950), G. Wallach ( Wallach , 1949), K. Pratt ( Pratt , 1950) and even earlier E. Titchener ( Titchener , 1916) as the difference between visible field (world of sensations, reflecting the signs of things) and the visible world (world of objects, things, events).

Without questioning the really significant difference between the modal sensory impressions and the amodal meaning, in which a wider aggregate of properties of the objective world and relations revealed by social practice is folded up, let us ask ourselves: is this limit so fundamental and irresistible? Indeed, for the existence of even individual sensational sensations, a network of categorical structures is needed. If we ignore the innate methods of categorization, which constitute, apparently, a smaller part of such structures, they also constitute a socially developed system of meanings. Many researchers have demonstrated convincing facts of the sociocultural determinism of sensory perceptions. Thus, the absence of certain color names in the language makes it impossible to distinguish between individual colors (Luria, 1974). The ancient Greeks did not perceive the blue color and, on the contrary, a large perceptual experience and developed categorical system allows the people of the North to distinguish hundreds of shades of white, and dyers - hundreds of shades of black. The values ​​used in sensory perception can be less differentiated, not fixed in the language, poorly reflective, reflect only the individual qualities of the object. In terms of J. Bruner, the categorization can be richer (“this is a crystal glass cut in Denmark”), poorer (“this is a glass object”), very poor (“this is an object, not a sound”), in principle - all this values ​​of different degrees of differentiation.

“... It seems to me an optional and unreasonable assumption that the sensory processes on which higher order categorization is based are radically different from the

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sov comparison and identification, which are part of our perceptions. The basic assumption that we must make from the very beginning is that every perceptual experience is the final product of the categorization process. We must accept this assumption for two reasons. The first is that perceptions are generic in the sense that everything that is perceived belongs to a certain class and only through it acquires its meaning ... The fact of the existence of objects, events or sensations that are not attributable to any category - at least the category a certain modality, is so far from any experience that it should be recognized as supernatural without hesitation ... More serious, though purely logical, is the question of how a person can tell others about whether he is not generic or full awn individual experience. Neither language, nor preliminary training, which can be given to the organism to control any other form of external reaction, makes it possible to say nothing except in terms of gender or category. If any perception turned out to be not included in the category system, that is, free from being assigned to any category, it would be doomed to remain an inaccessible gem, a firebird, combed in silence by individual experience ” {Bruner, 1977, p. 13-16). It can be added to this that it is just as difficult to imagine for yourself not only perception, but also something in general that has become the content of the subjective consciousness outside the categories of this consciousness. “Nature opens only through the lattice of names, and it, which without such names would remain dumb and invisible, sparkles far behind them, constantly appears on this side of this grid, which, however, opens it to knowledge and makes it visible only through the penetrating language " {Foucault, 1977, p. 39).

Although not constructs, but specific objects, phenomena, relationships, or individual sensory impressions, are presented to our consciousness, each time it can be shown that perception is mediated by a certain categorization system. “Order is what is defined in things as their internal law, as a hidden network, according to which they relate to each other, and at the same time what exists, only passing through the prism of sight, attention, language; in its depth, order is found only in the empty cells of this grid, waiting in silence for the moment when it will be formulated ... ” {Ibid.).

As for the mismatch of the sensory tissue and meaning recorded in many experiments, or, if other terms are used, the mismatch between the “visible world” and the “visible field”, this result should be interpreted as

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dissociation between different levels of categorization. Sensual and objective values, apparently, have a different measure of stability, assimilation and awareness, and in specially constructed experiments they may not coincide, and even contradict each other. (It was not without reason that the main phenomena of their breeding were demonstrated in such experiments, for example, in inverted vision conditions.) The possibility of such a mismatch is also determined by the duality of the existence of values ​​for the subject. It consists in the fact that meanings can appear before a subject both as objects of his consciousness, and as methods and “mechanisms” of awareness (see: A. Leontiev, 1975). This duality is realized when some categories appear as the “object” of consciousness, and others - as a “mechanism”.

A.N. Leontiev discusses only the highest form of categorization, reduced, moreover, to a fixed, verbalized, supraindividual and abstract meaning in language. However, to signify an object, giving it a name, one can not only remain within the confines of speech. To perceive or experience it in a certain capacity is also to categorize. These categories may not be identical to verbal meanings, classifications may be used that have no explicit designations that are difficult or completely unrecognizable 1. They are “more likely to be felt than understood, their awareness is intuitive in nature”, but nevertheless they “may well be more rational than explicitly expressed classifications” { Whorff , 1956, p. 80). Mechanisms of perceptual qualification can be based on generalizations of a different kind: “sensory standards” (Wenger, 1969), “semantic-perceptual universals” ( Artemyeva, 1980, 1986), “subject values”, “operational units of perception” {Zinchenko, 1966, 1971), "constructs" { Kelly , 1963, 1970), "lattices" {Fransella, Bannister, 1987). Categorization can be richer, more differentiated, “articulated” or, on the contrary, poorer, rougher and simpler, but it should always be.

The recognition of the existence of categorical value systems as the main tool of consciousness poses a number of complex theoretical and practical questions, and this work will be devoted to the attempts to answer them.

Some of these questions require clarification, since they are part of the rationale for the approach itself and contain some assumptions,

1 B. Whorf called such subtle classifications “cryptotypes”.A crypto-type is “a deep, subtle, elusive meaning that does not find expression in real words” { Whorff , 1956, p. 70).

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needing additional theoretical discussion. Answers to others can only be given after the presentation of the relevant experimental material. Let us begin with the most important theoretical questions in my opinion.

2.2. The problem of the origin of categories. "Primary Vision" in intraceptive perception

The first thing that needs to be explained is where the categories themselves come from. Apparently, it is necessary to recognize some of them as primary, inborn, and some as acquired.

По замечанию Дж. Брунера (1977), полный список врожденных категорий — это излюбленный предмет философских споров, на который было потрачено слишком много чернил и слишком мало экспериментальных усилий. Это одна из наиболее широко обсужда емых тем в генетической психологии, этологии и зоопсихологии и, в принципе, существование таких категорий (но не конкретный список) можно считать доказанным ( Hebb , 1949; Piaget , 1951; Tinbergen , 1951; Хайдн, 1975). На базе первичных, врожденных ка тегорий строятся вторичные, производные. Их развитие связано с обучением, воспитанием и усвоением выработанных в культуре си стем эталонов. Специфика человеческого развития заключается в том, что все его психические функции претерпевают глубочайшие изменения, превращаясь из натуральных в культурно опосредство ванные ( Durkheim , 1912; White , 1949; Выготский, 1960, 1982; Запорожец, 1963; Венгер, 1969; Лурия, 1974; Леонтьев А.Н., 1975, 1981). Это принципиальное преобразование не только трансформи рует содержание психических функций и их проявление в челове ческой деятельности, но делает невозможным их понимание с точки зрения натурального подхода.

Это утверждение уже давно стало тривиальностью в науке, однако рассуждения о культурно-исторической опосредствованности касались лишь высших психических функций, не распространяясь на интрацепцию и телесность. Таким образом, целый блок весьма важной области человеческого существования оказался «теоретичес ки невидим». Это произошло, возможно, потому, что телесность, с реальностью которой человек сталкивается, как правило, в случае ее «неисправности», относилась к компетенции, главным образом, медицины.

Прежде всего, на мой взгляд, должно быть изменено это стран ное, но тем не менее прочно сложившееся положение, и на телес ные явления должны быть распространены принципы социализации натуральных процессов и функций. В онтогенезе человек усваивает

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не только категории экстрацептивного восприятия типа геомет рических форм, цветов спектра, фонем языка и пр., но и соци ально выработанные формы восприятия и проявления телеснос ти, в том числе и интрацептивные болезненные ощущения (к более подробному обсуждению специфики социализации телеснос ти мы обратимся далее, ограничившись здесь лишь признанием ее необходимости).

Второй, весьма важный вопрос, на который необходимо ответить с самого начала, также тесно связан с проблемой происхождения ка тегорий, но уже на уровне индивидуального акта восприятия. Этот вопрос вызван необходимостью разрешения фундаментального па радокса восприятия, заключающегося в следующем: чтобы воспри нять объект, необходимо подобрать соответствующую категорию, однако для того, чтобы ее подобрать, необходимо знать к чему под бирать. Невозможно достаточно логично объяснить выбор правиль ной категории восприятия до акта восприятия и невозможен акт восприятия без правильно подобранной категории. «Чтобы воспри нимать мир, необходимо уже иметь идеи о нем. Знание о мире объяс няется из предположения, что такое знание уже имеется. Безразлич но, приобретаются эти идеи или они врожденны: порочно само круговое рассуждение» ( Gibson , 1966, р. 142).

Смягчить этот парадокс можно, только изменяя трактовку вос приятия.

Во-первых, следует предположить существование неких ядерных, базальных конструктов, позволяющих начать работу с объек том, разворачивая затем сколь угодно сложную сеть и трансформируя способы репрезентаций.

По нашему мнению, формой ядерного субъективного сущест вования выступает категоризация в виде эмоционально-оценочных конструктов, представляющих сущность своеобразного «первови-дения» (Тхостов, 1976; Артемьева, 1980). На этом этапе «...давая описание объекта, испытуемый считает необходимым указать, ка ким (полезным ли, удобным ли, приятным ли) является этот объект в возможных взаимоотношениях с ним... "Вопросы к объек ту", которые задаются субъективными структурами опыта... форму лируются на языке эмоционально-оценочных координат» (Артемь ева, 1980, с. 27). В специальных экспериментах при восприятии и опознании объекта в условиях дефицита времени и (или) возмож ности манипуляции стимульным материалом (тахистоскопическое восприятие, непроизвольное запоминание) была показана веду щая роль системы эмоционально-оценочных категорий по сравнению с гностическими — типа цвета и формы (Тхостов, 1976). Это позволяет предполагать, что на некотором этапе генезиса перцепта

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(а именно на этапе первичной категоризации) системы, вклю чающие субъективно значимые свойства, первичны. На этапе «первовидения» выясняются самые грубые (но наиболее важные с эво люционной точки зрения) качества объекта: опасен ли он, хорош ли, — отражающиеся в виде базового разделения объектов на приятные и неприятные. Поэтому вполне понятно, почему эмоцио нально-оценочные качества оказываются ведущими. Подобный спо соб субъективного отражения, видимо, имеет врожденную основу. Во всяком случае, это не противоречит этологическим данным, показывающим возможности новорожденных животных отличать силуэты опасных и неопасных объектов. Гипотеза о базовом харак тере эмоционально-оценочных координат восприятия высказыва лась и во многих психоаналитических работах ( Klein , Heimann , Isaacs , Riviere , 1952; Spitz , 1968).

Непервичный характер собственно сенсорных качеств подтверж дается многими на первый взгляд парадоксальными фактами, на пример тем, что впечатление о стимуле возникает по времени рань ше, чем знание о том, с помощью чего воспринят объект (зрение, слух и пр.). Ответ на второй вопрос требует специальных усилий и знание такого рода явно вторично ( Posner , 1978).

Только признание существования ядерной формы субъектив ного отражения позволяет понять многочисленные феномены «перцептивной защиты» — повышения порога восприятия опасных, неприятных или социально неодобряемых стимулов ( Bruner , Postman , 1949; Rosen , 1954). В этих явлениях совершенно непонятно не то, что порог восприятия может изменяться в ту или иную сторону (само по себе это не очень удивительно), но то, как он вообще может изменяться в зависимости от значения и смысла воспринимаемого стимула до его восприятия. То есть, для того, чтобы не воспринять объект, его нужно сначала воспринять. В прин ципе, тот же парадокс содержится в психоаналитических феноме нах «значащего» забывания или ошибки. В этом случае, чтобы «оши биться» или «забыть», необходимо также сначала правильно вспомнить.

Форма презентированности объекта сознанию определяется используемыми категориями и меняется соответственно переходу от одной системы координат к другой. В опытах Д.Н. Узнадзе по опознанию предметов на ощупь, было выяснено, что чувственные впе чатления до акта опознания и после него существенно различны: «...лабильность, неопределенность, безликость должны, по нашему мнению, наиболее характеризовать так называемые ощущения — эту предшествующую настоящему восприятию ступень, где они и приобретают свою определенность и конкретную индивидуальность.

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Стоит испытуемому опознать экспонируемый объект хотя бы не верно, как чувственное содержание его сознания значительно видо изменяется, приобретая конкретность и превращаясь в определенное законченное переживание... В зависимости от вида предполагаемого испытуемым предмета одно и то же ощущение переживается им в различных, а иногда даже противоположных качествах. Конечно, не содержание ощущений определяет значение предъявляемого объек та, но напротив, значение предъявленного объекта придает ясное и определенное содержание самим ощущениям» (Цит. по: Смирнов С.Д., 1981, с. 18).

Этот совершенно неординарный феномен не привлек к себе в свое время того внимания, которого он явно заслуживал, скорее всего потому, что он противоречил доминировавшей в науке реф лекторной теории восприятия и имел явно выраженный привкус идеализма. Действительно, если принять его за реальность, ста новится очень трудно понять, как же на самом деле строится вос приятие: если качество ощущения определяется значением предме та и именно через него получает стабильное существование, то откуда, как не из ощущения, берется значение предмета? Экс перимент Д.Н. Узнадзе может быть объясним только через пороч ный круг.

The situation is resolved by changing the interpretation of the experiment. The point is that the subject had to reflex exactly the observable, modally defined sensations, and it was they who demanded the existence of a perceptual hypothesis, changing their quality depending on it. Apparently, a different situation would be when the object was perceived in emotional-evaluative coordinates. Unfortunately, DNNaznadze does not have such data, but the necessary results were obtained in a similar experiment by L.A. Zhukova (1976). The subjects were asked to touch the bars with a different fact of the surface and as accurately as possible to report information about this texture. The stable core of the tactile properties of the percept turned out to be not estimates within the corresponding modality (tactile properties of the groped objects), but properties with an evaluative or emotional component (see: Artemieva, 1980).

The special stability of emotional signs suggests that categorical systems that include emotional, “subjective” properties are used in the early phases of percept generation and one can speak not only about sensory, but also about a special kind of “emotional” universals. Experienced emotions, like experienced manipulations with an object, create systems of scales and assessments that determine the attitude to the object and create a special form of subjectivity, a kind of emotional

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“Sensual fabric”, which gives the object a sensual existence not in the form of color or stretch, but in the form of emotional experience.

It can be assumed that the less developed, socialized is the sphere of perception, the greater the place in it is occupied by primary, nuclear forms of objectification. Therefore, the prevailing qualification of bodily sensations in emotional and evaluative categories becomes understandable.

Consider the “normal” version of the generation of a subjective picture of the disease, starting with the somatic, bodily sensations caused by one or another pathological process in the body. If we single out the very first stage of “primary categorization” of these sensations, then they represent an extremely unformed, poorly formulated, unclearly localized uncomfortable state, which can be perceived only in emotional-evaluative coordinates of the “good-good” type. These “dark”, prodromic sensations are very similar in their quality to the “anticipations” described in the experiments of D.N. Uznadze. The duration of this phase significantly depends on age, experience of the disease, the development of a categorical network of intraceptive sensations, the possibility of testing the emerging hypotheses.

The act of denoting sensory sensations turn into a perceptual image, the core of which is the scheme of the body. As a result of this, sensations from unsteady and indefinite become specific, get their localization, a comparable degree of intensity, modality, correlate with cultural, perceptual and linguistic standards, can be verbalized.

Although we are talking here about the role of the act of meaning, in fact, this is not a very precise definition. Unmarked, even emotionally, sensations are completely inaccessible to consciousness and should be considered supernatural just as with extracept. This term should be understood rather arbitrarily, as the separation of intraceptual perception at the level of “primary vision” and categorical perception. Experimental study of intraceptive “vision” is extremely difficult due to the short duration of this phase, as well as its fundamental inaccessibility for reflection. Since the intraceptive act is also purely “internal” both in the sense of flow and in the sense of the “location” of the stimulus, the experimenter cannot control it in any way and has to rely to a great extent on indirect data. This also dictates the strategy of experiments that are different from studies of extraceptual perception, where the stimulus is available for control.

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The categorization of sensory data in the form of sensory modalities translates them from “dark” feelings into concrete ones that have sensory content. The methods of formation and assimilation of these culturally developed standards in the case of intraception also cannot be directly borrowed from extraception. Since somatic, bodily sensations are a reflection of the “object” inside each individual, the quality itself, the modality of these sensations cannot be directly related to the sensations of the “other”. The question arises, what then allows individuals to compare these feelings and understand each other? After all, they are not united by subject-practical activity with the same object (as is the case with the knowledge of objects of the external world).

The way out of this situation, the possibility of assimilating cultural standards, is apparently related to the correlation of intraceptive sensations with extraceptual ones. Such an assumption requires, of course, special proof, and we present it here only as a fairly plausible hypothesis. Its validity is confirmed by the semantics of modalities, qualities of int raceptive sensations. So, the pain is called “cutting”, “stabbing”, “acute”, “dull”, etc., such are the sensations of “burning”, “bursting”, “burning”, “pressing”, “sore”, “freezing "Etc. Special linguistic analysis shows that the popular naming of diseases in the Russian language conveys their external features, and the names of painful sensations come from designating either specific actions with a sharp instrument or various mechanical influences (in both case of extraceptive) (Merkulova, 1975).

J. Engel ( Engel , 1959, 1970) suggests that a person, describing an intraceptive sensation (in his case, pain), uses concepts related not to the “language of pain”, but to the circumstances in which this pain was once tested, or to an imaginary situation in which he could experience it. So, the patient says that he is in acute pain, imagining a cut, dull - like pressure sensations, burning - burns, etc. When a patient with coronary insufficiency speaks of his pain “as if the chest is crushed,” he most likely builds a description in terms of an “imaginary situation.”

G.E. Rupchev (2001), highlighting the psychological specifics of the “inner body,” stresses that in addition to the fact that internal bodily sensations have a genetic connection with extraception, their structure corresponds to the structure of metaphor.

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A metaphor is one of the types of the path, a turn of speech, where the common feature of two compared words (objects) is transferred to one of them, which at the same time gets a “figurative” meaning.

Many names of bodily sensations, being metaphorical in origin, have not been perceived like that for a long time because of their frequent use. For example, “the heart hurts”, “the head is broken”, - these sensations in everyday language have the character of specific bodily sensations. In their metaphorical forms, they are perceived (detected) and represented as the primary, elementary symptom to the doctor, without implying any subjective processing.

In addition to these conventional intraceptive metaphors, an individual language allows a person to be creative in explaining one's well-being, but some of the comparisons are already of clinical importance. These are the classic hysterical stigmas - “globus hystericus” (sensation of a lump in the throat), “clavus hystericus” (feeling of a hammered nail), inflicting pain “like a hoop”.

Perhaps it is in the process of intraception that the subject gets the opportunity to use metaphor as a method of transmitting untranslated information. The mechanism of metaphor is to "transfer" values ​​from one object to another. In this context, the region of the inner body, inaccessible to the direct “object” perception, needs a “form” that should be associated with the most generalized human practice. So, an obscure feeling of discomfort in the stomach, not talking about anything, except that it is not normal, borrowing meaning from ordinary activities, takes on a form of feeling of heaviness in the stomach, which is easier to imagine based on the meaning of the word "heaviness" strike what one can feel when there is a feeling of discomfort.

In the realm of inner physicality, the phenomenon of metaphor is already “not a luxury that literature can afford, not a rare esoteric or purely decorative means” ( Goodman, 1978 - quoted from: Rupnev, 2001, p. 199), but a method of sign mastering, psychological function that has several aspects related to each other:

• Metaphor verbalizes intraceptive sensation. In this way, in the words, a primary idea is achieved, an awareness of what is going on inside the body.

• Metaphor enables the communication of inner bodily experience so that it is understood by others. In this sense, the metaphor allows you to "contain" (according to Winnicott) pain. Here it can be assumed that alexithymic subjects, for example, having

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Narrowed psycho-semantic and, therefore, metaphorical resources can “underperform” the understanding and sympathy of others in what they feel, leaving a lot of “uncontaminated” feelings inside.

• Metaphor, mediating the intraceptive process, which has an active cognitive character, shaping the inner bodily sensation into an object for consciousness, thereby building a distance between them, perhaps sometimes facilitating its experience, since the pain in the metaphor becomes something understandable rather than incomprehensible , indescribable and therefore scary.

• Semantic transformation, metamorphosis, performed in a metaphor, gives inner bodily sensation a new degree of reality (“Metaphor is a verbal structure that, by virtue of its form, confirms the reality of the object” (Jor Dan, 1967 — quoted from: Rupchev, 2001)) .

Thus, the metaphor of inner physicality not only solves the known difficulties of communicating the quality of its sensations, 2 but is one of its central characteristics.

2.3. Body image and body sensation

Let us return once more to the paradox of perception. The second condition that allows him to mitigate and sufficiently consistently explain the origin of categories is the refusal to consider perception as a single act, torn from the current perceptual activity. The main erroneous assumption of a theoretical nature is that the sensory impression caused by one or another external influence is considered as an elementary knowledge, from which, due to its “processing”, knowledge of a higher level is built. It assumes the direct nature of obtaining the initial elements of knowledge. In fact, a sensual impression becomes substantively related, i.e. it becomes an element of knowledge not directly and directly, but only when it acts as a link in a cyclic process initiated by the subject, i.e. the initial link of which is a movement from a subject to an object in the form of a cognitive hypothesis, prior knowledge or regulated

2 Virginia Woolf notes in her essay “When you are sick” that “... English, capable of expressing Hamlet’s thoughts and the tragedy of King Lear, has no words for trembling and headache ... as soon as the sufferer tries to describe his headache to the doctor , the richness of the language disappears ... "(Quoted in: Melcak , 1981, p. 42).

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practical action (see: Smirnov SD, 1983a). The presence of stimulation is only a condition, not the cause of the emergence of a sensory image (ibid.).

This is by no means an acceptance of an objectively idealistic point of view, which derives all perception from the subject and ignores the contribution of the objective world (by the way, this approach is not shared by any of the modern philosophical trends). The point is that it is impossible to understand perception if one proceeds from individual sensory data that are not inscribed in the constantly existing context - “the image of the world”. Just as a separate individual is not a Robinson, but it masters culturally worked stereotypes in continuous communication with society, and a single sensual impression does not appear in the form of deus ex machina against the background of “empty consciousness”. “The image of the world is the system of expections (expectations), which generates an object — hypotheses, on the basis of which the structuring and objective identification of individual sensory impressions take place. In order for this process to begin, objective objectivity of the hypothesis is not of fundamental importance. If the hypothesis is erroneous, the individual sensations do not get the nature of stable structures ... (a separate image. - A. T.) taken out of context, is a psychologically dead formation, i.e. it can be nothing more than an element of the image of the world or its actual part ... it is not the image that orientates, but the contribution of this image to the picture of the world ... it can be said that the individual impulses of external reality do not form our idea of ​​the world, but only confirm, supplement or correct it ”( Smirnov, SD, 1981, p. 19).

The image of the world as a holistic and orderly system is not only a means used to “process” the stimulus. Everything is just the opposite: the main contribution to the construction of the image is made not by individual sensory impressions, but by the whole system of the image of the world itself. A radical and complete overcoming of the stimulating paradigm, which treats perception as a reactive process, is possible only with the understanding of cognition as a process initiated by the subject, directed towards stimulation. This process not only starts in response to an event that has happened in reality, but exists continuously.

For intraception, such a continuously existing background will be a kind of sensory tissue of normal functioning - well-being, what the old doctors called "vigor vitalis", in the context of which individual bodily sensory impressions will receive their existence.

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2.4. The problem of verification of intraceptive perception

The rejection of the stimulus paradigm of perception and recognition of subjective activity, within the framework and forms of which only the cognition of reality can be realized, the decisive role, alleviates the paradox of perception, but rather sharply raises the problem of the truth of its results. If they are determined primarily by the existing continuous context, and only then by the available stimulation, then, in principle, there is the possibility of distorting the qualities of objective reality over a wide range. The set of categories and their structure will greatly affect how we perceive the world. This is obviously to be accepted, if we understand the act of perception as defined not only objectively, from the outside - by the characteristics of the stimulus, but also from the inside - by the subjective characteristics.

“People who use markedly different grammars are sent by their grammars to different types of observations and to different assessments of externally similar acts of observation, and therefore they are not equivalent observers and should come to different ideas about the world ... The same physical evidence does not lead all observers to the same picture of the universe, except in cases where their lingual bases are similar or they can be compared in some way ”( Whorff , 1956, p. 214, 221). As P. Feyerabend (1986) points out, the latter means that observers using different categorical systems will postulate different facts under the same physical circumstances in the same physical world, or they will order the same facts in different ways.

What, then, ensures the necessary adequacy of the reflection of the world, the consistency of our perception of reality? “When we say that perception represents reality or corresponds to it, we usually mean that the results of perception can be more or less accurately predicted. This means that the object we see can also be touched or smelled and there must be some correspondence or congruence between what we see, feel and smell. Paraphrasing the statement of the young Bertrand Russell, one can say that what we see should be the same and on closer examination. Or in other words, the categorization of an object in perception is the basis for the appropriate organization of actions aimed at this object. For example, this object looks like an apple - and

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really, eating it, we are convinced of this ” (Bruner, 1977, p. 18). Although we perceive the world in the existing categories, and it is they who give a stable character to sensory impressions, nevertheless, there is a certain limit to the inconsistency of our categories of reality. The world is completely indifferent with the help of which categories we cognize it, and it will reveal its presence in full, even if, from the point of view of our ideas, some of its qualities should not exist. It is possible to build hypotheses about the structure of the world for as long as desired and to attribute to it, on the basis of our ideas about it, any, as much as fantastic qualities, but by entering into contact with it, we find the elasticity of reality. Можно быть со вершенно уверенным в собственной невесомости и даже чувство вать ее, но если мы захотим полетать, то довольно быстро ощутим необходимость привести наши фантазии и чувства в согласие с дей ствительностью. То же самое происходит и при менее драматичес ких обстоятельствах. Восприятие комнаты Эймса, с точки зрения наших конструктов, например, совершенно не соответствует ее ис тинному устройству, однако эта иллюзия рассеивается, если просто открыть второй глаз или, еще лучше, в эту комнату войти. Восприя тие — это развернутый во времени активный процесс, и поэтому нет пределов для выделения инвариантов все более высоких поряд ков, и человек может использовать разные уровни и формы действия, проверяя через них адекватность отражения.

Жизненная необходимость обеспечивает отражению адекват ность, без которой оно бы превратилось в пустой фантом. «Мы идем к действительности только лишь путем ощущений, но никогда не бывает так, чтобы она давалась в виде ощущений... Ощущения — всего лишь то, что вносится нашими органами чувств в восприятие. Живое существо имеет дело лишь с предметами, свои потребности оно удовлетворяет посредством них, а не с помощью цвета, запаха, вкуса (самих по себе)» (Узнадзе, цит. по: Надирашвили, 1976, с. 98).

При несовпадении экстраполируемых характеристик чувствен ных впечатлений с реально получаемыми в действиях, выходящих за рамки пассивной регистрации, должна происходить модифика ция познавательных гипотез о природе и характере источника стиму ляции. В большинстве случаев так и происходит, и наши представ ления о мире и налагаемая на него категориальная сеть постоянно подвергаются коррекции. Однако, как уже отмечалось, существуют довольно широкие пределы, позволяющие игнорировать требова ния реальности. Так, мы можем отличить яблоко от его воскового муляжа, находившегося за стеклом витрины, пытаясь от него отку сить; но можно представить себе специально изготовленный муляж

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яблока, неотличимый от натурального ни вкусом, ни запахом, но ядовитый. В таком случае верификация истинности яблока осуще ствляется через летальный исход.

Быстрота и адекватность смены конструктов зависят от огром ного числа психологических факторов, к конкретному анализу которых мы еще обратимся: когнитивного стиля, степени ригидности или гибкости, когнитивной дифференцированности, структуры категориальной системы, ее артикулированности, возможностей или ограничений действий и манипуляций с объектом и пр. Суще ствуют случаи особой ригидности концептуальных систем, в силу той или иной патологии практически не поддающихся коррекции. В качестве примера можно назвать бредовые конструкции, особен ность которых заключается не столько в степени ложности лежащей в их основе идеи (случай, довольно нередкий и в норме), сколько в полной ее некоррегируемости и непроницаемости для опыта. При столкновении идеи и реальности искажается реальность, причем до пределов, приводящих к летальному исходу (идея о собственной невесомости, например, в этом случае не коррегируется практикой падений).

Адекватность восприятия в значительной степени определяется качеством его проверки, возможностями манипулирования, сопос тавления, практической деятельности, изменения позиции. Суже ние возможностей такой проверки может приводить к стойким ил люзиям и неадекватности восприятия. Поскольку мир дан нам не непосредственно, а через инструмент наших ощущений, то при невозможности проверки мы будем относить искажения, рожденные самим инструментом, к качествам реальности.

П. Фейерабенд (1986) приводит очень интересный случай феномена, который стоит разобрать подробнее. Это неадекватность восприятия космических объектов при помощи телескопа, обна руженная