3. TYPE 2: THE EXTERNAL HARD AND INTERNAL SIMPLE LIFE WORLD

Lecture



Description of the world
Prototype
Realistic experience

The difference of this vital world from the previous one lies in its difficulties. Life benefits are not given here directly, the external space is saturated with obstacles, interference, resistance of things that prevent the satisfaction of needs. In order for life to be carried out, it is necessary to overcome these difficulties. And the main thing is that overcoming requires not only difficulty, i.e. a psychological "face" of an obstacle, but also its material body, having its certainty indifferent to the goals and needs of a given life, which creates the need to build a certain "body" capable of transcending the present boundaries of the life world. Such an “organ” must, on the one hand, possess physicality in order to speak with the world-in-itself in its world, the “material” language, and on the other - it must be permeated from within, it must be life from within. Any transcending by him of the life world, overcoming its boundaries, in fact, is an extension of the boundaries of life to previously completely external areas of it.

If we go from a phenomenological description to a description of a specifically scientific one, then this organ will turn out to be nothing more than a “living movement” (28, p. 178). It, as N. A. Bernstein brilliantly showed (27), in order to be successful, must be rebuilt every time in each new behavioral situation for the reason that the latter is always unique in terms of its dynamic characteristics.

The external, apparent expediency of the behavior of living beings in conditions of a subject and dynamically unique situation cannot be explained otherwise than by assuming that they have a mental reflection. [ 41 ] The external objective activity and the psyche, more precisely the activity mediated by the psyche, is the basic neoplasm necessary for life in a difficult world compared to the light. [ 42 ]

What is the chronotope of the analyzed life world? The difficulty of the external world in terms of chronotope means the presence of "length", i.e. spatial distance (life benefits) and temporal duration (necessary to eliminate distance). Phenomenologically, this is expressed in the appearance in the external aspect of the chronotope, along with “here” and “now” new dimensions “there” and “then”. In other words, the external aspect of the psychological world unfolds in a space-time perspective.

As for the internal structure of this vital world, it still remains simple. This lack of internal dissection and structuredness of life in the space-time scan means the absence of "conjugacy", i.e. lack of spatial connectedness, "juxtaposition" of life units (= relations = separate activities) and connections of the temporal sequence between them. We are talking about the absence of an internal “table”, using M. Foucault’s metaphor (159), on which the subject could “put” his relationship to the world before him, compare them, measure, compare, plan the sequence of their implementation, etc. and without which his inner world remains “simple” even with the multiplicity and objective overlap of his life relations. However, for convenience of reasoning, we will mainly use such an imagined life world, the simplicity of which is provided by its supposed mono-composition, i.e. the subject has only one need, one life relation. Phenomenologically, "simplicity" is expressed as "it is always."

We now describe the livelihoods and attitudes of creatures living in a difficult and simple world. The activities in this world are characterized by a steady tendency towards the subject of need, this activity is not subject to any distractions that lead to temptation and temptation, the subject knows no doubts, hesitations, feelings of guilt and torture of conscience - in a word, the simplicity of the inner world frees the activity from all possible internal obstacles and restrictions. She knows only one obstacle - external.

Each achievement of the subject of need is as if it were a matter of life and death. So, it is, however, psychologically, and there, because here there is an identification of one relation (activity) with all life in general. Therefore, the activity of this creature from the emotional and energetic side is distinguished by ferocity - in order to achieve the cherished subject, it is ready to make any efforts, everything is at stake, any means is justified in advance, any risk is meaningful, any sacrifice is acceptable.

Due to the simplicity of the inner world, the semantic structure of the image of the outer world is extremely simplified. It is made in two colors: each object is interpreted only from the point of view of its usefulness or harmfulness to satisfy the always tense only need of the subject.

Another thing is the technical, operational aspect of activity and its corresponding reflection. It accounts for the main problem of the life of this creature. The world puzzles him only from this external, technical side: "How to do, how to achieve?" - this is the main question that confronts him. And the basic general rule for solving this constantly renewing life task is the need to adequately reflect reality in order to build up our activities in accordance with reality. Such consistency is a prerequisite for the existence and preservation of life in a difficult world. Submission to the dictates of reality becomes here the law of life, its principle.

What is the relationship between the reality principle and the pleasure principle? These relationships were well known in philosophy and psychology long before the advent of psychoanalysis. [ 43 ] H. Freud gave only terminology and described them with appealing simplicity? "We know that the principle of satisfaction is inherent in the primary mode of operation of the psychic apparatus and that for the self-preservation of the organism among the difficulties of the external world, it is from the very beginning unsuitable and even to a high degree dangerous. Under the influence of the organism’s aspiration for self-preservation, this principle is replaced by the “reality principle”, which, without leaving the ultimate goal of achieving pleasure, postpones the possibilities of satisfaction and temporarily suffers displeasure on a long detour to pleasure ”(157, p.39).“ All this is extremely elementary, - wrote L. S. Vygotsky and A. R. Luria (51, p. 6), - is alphabetical, and, apparently, belongs to the number of irrefutable self-evident truths ".

Nevertheless, there are a number of unexplained issues. The first of these concerns the degree of independence of the reality principle. Z. Freud does not have an unequivocal answer to this question. In some cases, he called the reality principle a modification of the pleasure principle, in others he said that the reality principle is replaced by the pleasure principle. But in general, the principle of reality, according to Freud, is in the service of the principle of pleasure and not having independence. In a sense, this is true, especially when reality is understood as real, material reality, but it seems to us that the emphasis should be somewhat shifted. Since following the reality is so important that without it life in a difficult world would be simply impossible, then it must be assumed that the situational necessity of obeying reality sooner or later gives rise to a supra-situational, global attitude to follow it. Of course, genetically it develops under the influence of the principle of pleasure and from it, or rather from the life processes corresponding to it, draws its energy, but in the end this umbilical cord breaks, and a new law, the principle of reality, appears in the life world.

The second, more important, question is connected with the clarification of the internal psychological mechanisms of realization of the reality principle. This principle has two sides. One of them is turned outward and consists in striving to ensure the adequacy of external movements to the objective conditions of the situation at the expense of the accuracy of the mental reflection of these conditions, the second is inward. Its purpose is to restrain possible emotional explosions, which by virtue of the "simplicity" of the inner world in case of dissatisfaction, they threaten to destroy with their chaotic outburst all difficult organized activities aimed at delayed satisfaction of needs. In other words, the internal self-image A realistic installation is a mechanism of patience.

Consider the chronotopic structure of this mechanism. We have established above that the chronotope of the type being described now can be phenomenologically expressed as "it is always" in the internal aspect and "here-and-there", "now-and-then" in the external.

What does it mean? “This always” means that the subject’s “consciousness” is always occupied with the same thing: all of his feelings, expectations, and activity are focused on one thing (“this”), which is the subject of his needs. He is all about the world, nothing else exists for him. And just as this relationship fills the entire spatial horizon of its life, it covers itself and its entire temporal perspective (“always”).

As for the external aspect of the chronotope, it is significantly changed from the first type. The subject of the need may be either in direct contact with the subject, more precisely, with the organ of consumption, or at some distance. The same applies to the time aspect. But the main thing for characterizing a difficult life world, as opposed to a light one, is not in itself such an objective circumstance, but the fact that it is “grasped” by the subject with the help of special mental forms (phenomenologically meaning “there” and “then”). At their expense, the psychological world of the subject is expanded and differentiated in comparison with the infantile one. If in the latter there were no subjective "there" and "then" could not exist, and the objective delay and distance of the good turned into an internal emotional catastrophe, now these phenomenological "there" and "then" can accumulate in themselves all this emotional energy, making it possible to control above her. By bringing the matter to the utmost rationalistic simplicity, one can say that the dissatisfaction of the only need that constitutes the whole life of the subject would be felt by him as the end of this life, as death, if he did not know that somewhere "there" is the source of life and someday "then" he can be reached.

The same can be expressed differently, in the language of emotional categories: if, in the absence of the forms "there" and "then", the emotional state of the subject oscillates between "bliss" and "horror", then with the appearance of such forms of psychological space-time, these initial affects are differentiated , such that the derived emotions include in their structure the indicated forms psychologically far and future, namely, “carelessness” appears (in a situation that has not yet achieved, but already surely guaranteed future good), “despair” ( of undoubted forthcoming failure), "hope" and "fear" (in intermediate cases) (61).

The emergence of a space-time psychological "length" ("there" and "then") is an enrichment of the structure of the psychological world, which now becomes capable of grasping the future and the distant former in its reach. And the most important thing is that this future and distant are not absolute, physical forms, which are recorded from a point outside the current processes, from an extra-spatial and timeless position of an absolute observer projecting real processes onto the ideal space-time coordinates, i.e. this future is not what is not now, but what will happen later, but vice versa: the phenomenological future ("then", "then"), psychologically represented in hope, fear, etc., is paradoxically what is now, but which then will not. Hope to get that object is a form of the psychological future, which is actually present now and disappears as such in the actual achievement of this object.

From these arguments, one fundamental point emerges: it turns out that objective activity presupposes the existence of certain internal, phenomenological conditions, without which it would be psychologically impossible at all. These conditions form a complex and mobile complex of mechanisms, which conditionally can be called "patience" and which is phenomenologically structured by what was described above in terms of the difficult and simple world chronotop, and psychologically (in an emotional aspect) - by states of "despair" and "fear "," hope "and" carelessness. In other words, the external objective activity would be psychologically impossible if at the same time, as if on its wrong side, the internal work on retaining panic affects generated by an unmet need did not unfold. This work is carried out at the expense of partial subjective - updating the objectively missing good (in the form of hope, for example), filling the gap between "now" and "then" with meaningfulness.

All this supports us in the conviction that the reality principle is an independent psychological attitude that possesses its own internal mechanisms, and not just a modification of the pleasure principle.

Prototype

We point out the well-known prototypes of a simple and difficult life world. It is clear that these include all cases in which one kind of need (motive, attitude) gets a sharply dominant position and intensity incompatible with the strength of other needs. When the content of the dominant motive is any abstract idea, conviction, we are dealing with a fanatic, when its content forms some concrete idea or even a concrete thing or action - a maniac. [ 44 ]

An analysis of the psychology of fanaticism reveals the characteristics we identified in describing the type of behavior: the frenzy of behavior, the willingness to achieve the goal of sacrificing everything and using any means in combination with the narrowness and limitations of perception of the world.

The prototype of the type described is not only the personality of a certain warehouse, but also certain personal states, more or less long-lasting, normal or pathological. These include, say, the “impulsive drives” that are well known in psychopathology, which “represent acutely arising impulses and aspirations, subordinating the whole consciousness and behavior of the patient. With their occurrence, all other desires and ideas are suppressed” (115, p.63) .

The field of psychopathology gives the closest examples to this theoretical type, but it does not, of course, follow from this that any condition corresponding to the second type of psychological world is pathological. Consciousness enters such a state whenever a motive that requires a certain activity from a subject is actualized, and there is no alternative to this motive (at least at the moment).

Realistic experience

The common basis of all the processes of experiencing, peculiar to this type of life, is the mechanism of patience. In fact, he himself can be considered a process of experiencing. The example of this mechanism shows that life, when it comes out of the primary state of blissful satisfaction, cannot exist without experiencing processes that hold it together from within, exposed in a difficult and complex world to various destructive and disintegrating influences.

Before turning to the discussion of mechanisms that grow on the basis of patience, it is necessary to compare patience itself as a mechanism that obeys the principle of reality with psychological protection acting on the principle of pleasure. On the one hand, they are opposite, on the other - they converge at one point. Both defense and patience actualize in the mind a sense of the presence of a good that is objectively absent, but the modal forms of these actualizations differ significantly. Protection recognizes the benefit of being existent in cash, patience recognizes the benefit in exalting cash; the defense creates the illusion of the solution of the problem (or its absence: "the grapes are green"), patience forms the consciousness of its solvability; the defense refuses to see the insecurity of being attained positive (or eliminated negative) emotional states, patience is focused on eliminating this insecurity; the defense finally takes the inviolability of subjectivity (desires, self-esteem, feelings of security, etc.) and distorts the image of reality to please it, patience takes reality as a basis, restraining and adjusting subjectivity to it.

The mechanism of patience acts only within certain limits (which are determined by the development of the mechanism itself); outside of them, when a situation of impossibility arises (frustration), other mechanisms of experience are required. [ 45 ]

In the most general terms, there are two variants of a "realistic" experience.

The first is carried out within the limits of the affected life relationship. В простейшем, "нулевом" случае этого варианта переживания выход из критической ситуации, субъективно кажущейся неразрешимой, происходит не за счет самостоятельного психологического процесса, а в результате нежданного объективного разрешения ситуации (успех после неудачи, согласие после отказа, находка утраченного, разрешение запрещенного и т.п.). Это именно "нулевой" случай, ибо критическая ситуация здесь не психологически преодолевается, а фактически устраняется благодаря эффективному поведению (ср.: 26, с.49) или удачному стечению обстоятельств.

More complex cases that require special activity from the subject are carried out by compensating for lost (or reduced) abilities or substitution. Whatever the specific technique of the process, it proceeds from the fact of the actual impossibility of satisfying the need in these specific conditions and the need to satisfy it in one way or another. Since this is a realistic experience that does not resort to self-deception, the only conceivable solution is to transform the psychological situation, which nevertheless, in spite of everything, makes possible a real satisfaction of a frustrated need. The possibility of resolving vital aporia in this psychological world is ensured by two circumstances - the ability of the subject to postpone the satisfaction of need for a period of time,for which compensatory abilities can be developed, workarounds to the goal are found or created, as well as the ability to be satisfied with any substitution of the subject of need, so that it can satisfy it at all. The latter circumstance is especially important; the subject of a simple and difficult world does not know the subject (or person) in its individual definiteness and value uniqueness, he appreciates in him only one quality - to satisfy him, the subject, the need. The narrow and intense focus of the subject in the world creates the illusion that it is extremely fixed on a given object, literally “spliced” with it, however, should this object disappear, creating a situation of impossibility for this illusion to be quick. I found myself: a subject with a simple inner world agrees in principle to any surrogate,at least to some extent satisfying his need, because all the qualities of the subject, not directly related to the need satisfied by him, do not affect him psychologically and are not taken into account.

Второй вариант "реалистического" переживания отличается от первого тем, что между нарушенным отношением, вызвавшим необходимость в переживании, и тем последующим жизненным отношением, нормальная реализация которого знаменует об успехе переживания, нет субъективных связей преемственности. Хотя объективно, с позиции внешнего наблюдателя," идентифицирующего субъекта до и после переживания по его "индивидным" качествам, новая деятельность может представляться замещением старой, фрустрированной деятельности, компенсацией ее, внутренне они никак не связаны между собой. Это "компенсация", которая ничего не меняет в предыдущем, нарушенном жизненном отношении, никак само это нарушение не компенсирует, это замещение без замещения, ибо новая деятельность решает свои собственные проблемы. А поскольку каждая актуально осуществляемая деятельность в условиях простоты внутреннего мира субъективно составляет всю жизнь, то переживание это, по сути дела, представляет собой скачок от одной жизни (неудавшейся, да так и оставленной) к другой, психологически вновь начинаемой, хотя и строящейся на старом психобиологическом "индивидном" материале. Этот вариант переживания может быть проиллюстрирован примером Душечки, прожившей на страницах чеховского рассказа как бы несколько самостоятельных, не связанных одна с другой жизней.

Итак, законом переживания второго типа является принцип реальности. Это переживание исходит из того, что реальность "не слышит убеждений", что она непреодолима, борьба с ней бесполезна и, значит, нужно принять ее такой, какова она есть, покориться, смириться и внутри заданных ею границ и пределов попытаться добиться возможности удовлетворения потребностей.

Из проанализированных нами в первой главе видов переживания ни один однозначно не соответствует "реалистическому" переживанию, но, несколько огрубляя дело, можно сказать, что эмпирическим прототипом его является совпадающее поведение. При противопоставлении совладающего поведения защите, кроме прямого подчеркивания его реалистичности, обычно указывают на рациональность этих процессов, на их способность учитывать целостный характер ситуации, т.е. на те качества, которые сводимы к реалистичности. Кроме того, образцом, по которому мыслится совпадающее поведение, является приспособление, а приспособление по понятию есть процесс, целью которого является прилаживание, подгонка внутреннего, субъективного к внешнему, объективному, к реальности.


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Psychology of experience

Terms: Psychology of experience